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Abstract
We present a dynamic microstructure model where a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network
(CN) interact. Sequentially arriving traders with different valuations for an asset maximise their
profits either by trading on a DM or by submitting an order for (possibly) uncertain execution via a
CN. We develop the analysis for three different informational settings: transparency, "complete"
opaqueness of all order flow, and "partial" opaqueness (with observable DM trades). A key result is
that the interaction of trading systems generates systematic patterns in order flow for the
transparency and partial opaqueness settings. The precise nature of these patterns depends on the
degree of transparency at the CN. While unambiguous with a transparent CN, they may reverse
direction if the CN is opaque. Moreover, in all three informational settings, we find that a CN and a
DM cater for different types of traders. Investors with a high willingness to trade are more likely to
prefer a DM. The introduction of a CN next to a DM also affects welfare as it increases total order
flow by attracting traders who would otherwise not submit orders ("order creation"); in addition, it
diverts trade from the DM ("trade diversion"). We find that the coexistence of a CN and DM
produces more trader welfare than a DM in isolation. Also, more transparent markets lead to greater
trader welfare but may reduce overall welfare.
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An open issue in market microstructure is how investors behave when an asset trades simul-
taneously on several markets that may show a diﬀerent degree of transparency. The topics of
competition between markets and the optimal degree of transparency have become even more
relevant in recent years with the emergence of Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs). These
ATSs operate next to traditional exchanges and exhibit distinct institutional characteristics.
Therefore, when submitting an order, traders face the decision where to trade, taking into
account the advantages and disadvantages of each trading system.
In this paper we deal with Crossing Networks (CNs) which are one type of ATS. CNs are
deﬁned by the SEC (1998) as “systems that allow participants to enter unpriced orders to
buy and sell securities. Orders are crossed at a speciﬁed time at a price derived from another
market” (i.e. the continuous market). A pioneering CN is ITG’s POSIT but also the NYSE
has introduced post-close crossing sessions already in 1990.1 Currently, other traditional
markets are adding crossing facilities into their market structure, see e.g. Deutsche Börse’s
Xetra XXL in September 2001 or the Nasdaq Crossing Network in May 2007. Recently,
also investment banks opt to pool institutional order ﬂow into CNs as a response to new
regulatory initiatives like Regulation NMS in the US and MiFID in Europe (see e.g. the
Block Interest Discovery Service initiative (BIDS)). Despite the prevalence of CNs next to
continuous markets, the dynamic aspects of the coexistence of these systems have not been
well explored yet. In this paper we investigate the interaction of a CN and a continuous dealer
market (DM) by analyzing the impact of diﬀerent degrees of transparency on the composition
and the dynamics of the order ﬂow on both systems. In this way, we address long-standing
questions within the market microstructure literature: where do investors trade when there
are multiple trading venues for a single asset and what are the welfare implications of diﬀerent
degrees of transparency?
Our model for studying traders’ trading venue decisions starts from that of Parlour (1998).
While she models a limit order market, we deal with sequentially arriving traders having the
choice between a CN and a DM. When both trading systems coexist, traders can obtain guar-
anteed execution in the DM, opt for cheaper but (possibly) uncertain execution on the CN, or
refrain from trading. An important feature of the competition between CNs and traditional
1ITG’s POSIT is used by approximately 550 major institutions and broker/dealers and crossed about 35
million US shares per day in November 2005 according to Towergroup. The total market volume amounted
up to 98 million shares per day in the same period as compared to almost 1.8 billion for the NYSE.
1m a r k e t si st h a tt h e yo ﬀer a diﬀerent degree of transparency (see e.g. Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara
(2000)). Whereas traditional markets may vary in their degree of mandated transparency,
Regulations ATS and NMS in the US and MiFID in Europe do not require CNs to provide
information on their order book. We therefore investigate how diﬀerent degrees of trans-
parency at both markets inﬂuence traders’ order submission strategies and determine welfare
in the economy. More speciﬁcally, we develop the analysis for three diﬀerent informational
settings: transparency, “complete” opaqueness, and “partial” opaqueness. The transparency
case occurs when traders are fully informed about past order ﬂow at both markets and hence
observe the prevailing CN order book before determining their order choice. In reality, how-
ever, CNs are rather opaque. We incorporate this informational environment by analyzing
partial opaqueness: traders only observe previous trades at the DM. Complete opaqueness
implies that both markets are opaque such that traders are uninformed on past CN and DM
order ﬂow.
Common to the three informational settings, we ﬁnd that an increase in the DM’s relative
spread augments the CN’s order ﬂow. Moreover, the existence of a CN results in “order
creation”: investors with a relatively lower willingness to trade submit orders to a CN whereas
they would never trade at a DM. This order creation eﬀect induced by the CN is conﬁrmed
empirically in Gresse (2006). We also ﬁnd a “trade diversion” eﬀect, since the introduction
of a CN causes some trades to be diverted away from the DM to the new trading venue.
A key result of our paper is that the transparency and partial opaqueness settings generate
systematic patterns in order ﬂow. Although this result is reminiscent of the ﬁndings in Parlour
(1998) for a limit order market, two major diﬀerences exist. First, in Parlour’s model market
and limit orders each have implications for future order ﬂow. In our model, by contrast,
only CN orders produce systematic patterns in order ﬂow, as only the (expected) imbalance
between the queue of buy and sell orders at the CN matters. Clearly, DM trades do not
inﬂuence this imbalance. Secondly, we show that the transparency of a CN matters for the
nature of the order ﬂow patterns: compared to a transparent CN, order ﬂow patterns may
invert when an opaque CN operates next to a transparent DM. The result that order ﬂow
is informative about execution probabilities is novel to the market microstructure literature.
The intuition for this informativeness of order ﬂow is that, when markets are partially opaque,
o b s e r v i n gn oo r d e rﬂow relative to a DM-trade may be good news for a successive CN order
as it increases the potential for good counterparties; no order may also be bad news when it
2entails the preemption of a successive CN order. Overall, these theoretical insights point to
time-varying order ﬂow at a CN and trade ﬂow at a DM, even in the absence of asymmetric
information. Hence, it is important to take the interaction between trading systems, as well
as their individual microstructure, into account when measuring “normal” order ﬂow. For
example, successive DM buys caused by a persistently unfavorable imbalance of the CN-book
could wrongly be attributed to the activity of informed buyers. Further, our dynamic model
displays two externalities as documented in the static model of Hendershott and Mendelson
(2000). On the one hand, the CN is characterized by a positive (liquidity) externality as
adding a CN buy (sell) order is beneﬁcial to future sellers (buyers). On the other hand, a CN
exhibits a negative (crowding) externality as early arriving investors with a low willingness
to trade may preempt those with a higher willingness to trade who arrive later on the same
side of the market. Finally, a CN and a DM are shown to cater for diﬀerent types of traders:
unless the CN oﬀers certainty of execution, investors with a higher willingness to trade are
more inclined to trade at a DM.
Furthermore, we formally deﬁne and compare welfare for the CN in isolation, DM in iso-
lation, and coexistence of markets, to analyze the impact of diﬀerent degrees of opaqueness
on welfare. Our welfare analysis builds on previous work that studies welfare and the optimal
degree of transparency (see e.g. Pagano and Roëll (1996), Glosten (1998), Bloomﬁeld and
O’Hara (2000), Viswanathan and Wang (2002), Parlour and Seppi (2003), Goettler, Parlour
and Rajan (2005), and Rindi (2007)). Our paper complements this literature by considering
the impact of transparency on welfare in a setting where trading systems compete for unin-
formed order ﬂow. We employ two complementary welfare measures: “overall welfare” which
measures the gains from trade of all parties involved (including dealers), and “trader welfare”
which takes the traders’ perspective only. Our welfare results can be summarized as follows.
First, when comparing markets in isolation, we ﬁnd that a DM oﬀers both greater trader and
overall welfare than a CN when the execution probability at the CN and the relative spread
are low. That is when the time to a cross is short and the value of the asset is high. Second,
coexistence leads to greater trader welfare but may decrease overall welfare compared to a
DM in isolation. Third, more transparency unambiguously increases trader welfare as traders
anticipate their orders are revealed to potential counterparties. The impact of the degree of
transparency on overall welfare depends on the relative spread. When the relative spread is
high, transparency ranks better than both opaqueness settings. This result reverses when the
3relative spread is quite low. Our welfare results for coexistence stem from two forces. The
ﬁrst force adds to welfare due to order creation: some low willingness to trade investors now
may trade whereas they would not with a DM in isolation. The welfare contribution of order
creation hinges on the execution probability of these orders and increases in the degree of
transparency. The second force stems from trade diversion, i.e. traders that opt for the CN
while they would choose for the DM in the isolation case. In general, more trade diversion
increases trader welfare as these traders then prefer the possibly uncertain execution at the
CN above a DM trade. Overall welfare, however, may be lowered by trade diversion, as it
harms the dealer. Our analysis thus shows that increasing the transparency level might be
beneﬁcial but that the ultimate answer hinges on the exact welfare criterion that is employed.
Our paper is further related to two recent strands of research. A ﬁrst line of work de-
velops dynamic microstructure models for a limit order market, while focusing on diﬀerent
aspects: trading decisions of a variety of trader types submitting small orders (Harris (1998));
the impact of the limit order’s risk of being picked oﬀ on traders’ order submission strategies
(Foucault (1999)); order ﬂow persistence even in the absence of changes in the consensus value
of the asset (Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005)); the resiliency of the limit order market
(Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005)); and endogenous undercutting and strategic cancella-
tion of limit orders (Rosu (2005)).2 The limit order market model in Parlour (1998) describing
traders’ order placement strategies at the inside quotes is positioned closest to ours. However,
a number of important diﬀerences exist between both models. First, we analyze the optimal
order submission strategies and welfare consequences of traders who are confronted with the
choice between two trading venues with diﬀerent institutional characteristics, whereas Par-
lour (1998) considers the choice between market and limit orders within a single market.
Second, as the cross in the CN occurs at the DM midquote, our model allows for submitting
orders “within the spread”. Third, while Parlour (1998) deals with transparency (which is
the case for most limit order markets), we also consider two opaqueness settings. Finally,
the models’ resulting dynamics feature some important diﬀerences. In our model only a CN
order generates systematic patterns in order ﬂow, whereas in Parlour (1998) both market and
limit orders have an impact. In general, our paper contributes to this line of research as we
introduce a dynamic microstructure model to study (partly, at least) endogenous liquidity
supply by looking at the competition between two diﬀerent trading venues. This is in contrast
2Note that static equilibrium models of the limit order book are much more common. Examples include
Glosten (1994), Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Rock (1996) and Seppi (1997).
4to the previously mentioned papers which restrict themselves to only one market, i.e. a limit
order market.
A second line of recent work models competition between ﬁnancial markets when assets
trade at multiple markets. The seminal contribution is provided by Glosten (1994) who con-
siders the design of pure limit order markets to analyze their competitive viability. Parlour
and Seppi (2003) extend this model by focusing on competition between a pure limit order
market and a hybrid market. Foucault and Menkveld (2007) deal with order submission at
two pure limit order markets when a fraction of brokers applies Smart Order Routing Tech-
nologies (SORT).3 Recently, a few papers explicitly study the interaction between a CN and
a DM. Existing models, however, consider a static environment to analyze this competition.
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) develop a model where informed and uninformed traders
simultaneously decide to submit orders to one of both markets in order to analyze the eﬀect of
the introduction of a CN to a DM setting. Expanding on this paper, Dönges and Heinemann
(2006) focus on game-theoretic reﬁnements to accommodate the multiplicity of equilibria in
t h ec o o r d i n a t i o ng a m e .W ec o n t r i b u t et ot h i sl i n eo fw o r ka sw ee x p l i c i t l yi n t r o d u c ed y n a m i c s
into the analysis. These dynamics are important: a typical characteristic of a CN is that it
“matches” orders at a speciﬁed time during the trading day, while the other market simulta-
neously operates in a continuous fashion. In particular, traders arrive sequentially, and their
submission strategy is determined both by the current CN order book (when transparent)
and by their expectations of the behavior of future traders until the time of the cross.
There is by now a substantial number of empirical papers analyzing the interaction be-
tween trading systems (for an overview see Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005)). However, papers
empirically investigating the impact of a CN on other trading systems are still rather scarce.
Gresse (2006) studies the impact of the ITG’s POSIT on the DM segment of the London
Stock Exchange. She ﬁnds that POSIT has a share of total trading volume of about one to
two percent in these stocks, but that its probability of execution is still low (2-4%). Moreover,
she reports that activity at POSIT does not have a detrimental eﬀect on the liquidity at the
considered DM. Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) use proprietary data of US institutional
investors who choose between trading platforms. They ﬁnd that realized execution costs are
generally lower on alternative trading systems (including CNs). Næs and Ødegaard (2006)
3Other work on the competition between trading systems includes Glosten (1998), Santos and Scheinkman
(2001), Di Noia (2001), Viswanathan and Wang (2002), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) and Foucault and
Parlour (2004).
5focus on orders from the Norwegian Government Petroleum fund that are ﬁr s ts e n tt oaC N
and then, in the case of non-execution, to brokers. They also ﬁnd lower CN trading costs but
argue that these may be fully oﬀset by the non-trading costs due to adverse selection, which
are implicitly present at the CN. Næs and Skjeltorp (2003) ﬁnd that competition from CNs is
concentrated in the most liquid stocks. The signiﬁcant diﬀerences in liquidity between both
markets are partly related to the presence of informed trading in the non-executed CN stocks
(as in Næs and Ødegaard (2006)). Finally, Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) focus on the
impact of block trades on diﬀerent trading venues — a limit order book, a CN and an upstairs
market. They ﬁnd that competition from the two latter markets imposes no adverse eﬀect
on the liquidity of the limit order book.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model. Section 3
provides an analysis of the transparency case. We ﬁrst deal with the markets in isolation,
and then study their interaction. In Section 4, we consider two degrees of opaqueness, i.e.
partial and complete opaqueness. Section 5 oﬀers a discussion of the welfare implications of
our model, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2S e t u p o f t h e M o d e l
The model we develop is based on the setup in Parlour (1998). While her model discusses
the traders’ choice between market and limit orders in a continuous limit order market, we
adapt it to analyze competition between two trading systems.
In our economy, there are two days. Agents decide upon consumption on day 1 and
day 2, denoted by C1 and C2. Agents are risk neutral and diﬀer in their preferences over
consumption on these two days. These preferences are given by the following utility function:
U (C1,C 2;β)=C1 + βC2 (1)
with β being the subjective preference or type of the agent reﬂecting her personal trade-oﬀ
between current and future consumption. Next to these two “goods” C1 and C2, an asset
exists that pays out V units of C2 per share on day 2. As we investigate the short-term
interactions between both markets, the assumption of no uncertainty in V is a reasonable
starting point. During the ﬁrst day, the trading day, claims to the asset can be exchanged
for C1. Prices in the market are exchange ratios C1/C2. Agents can then construct their
6preferred consumption path by trading claims to this asset. The trading day consists of T
periods, indexed by t =1 ,...,T. Each period exactly one agent (also referred to as trader)
arrives in the market, and each agent arrives at most once. The arriving agent at time
t is characterized by two elements. First, her initial endowments determine her trading
orientation. With probability πB, she is a buyer and has one unit of the asset she can buy
in exchange for C1, which we denote by 1. With probability πS =1− πB,s h ei sas e l l e r
and has one unit of the asset she can sell, −1. Second, the agent arriving at t has a type
βt, which is drawn from an i.i.d. continuous distribution F (.) with corresponding density




,w h e r ew ea s s u m e0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ≤ ¯ β.T h i sβt,w h i c hi st a k e n
from the utility function above, could also be seen as a reﬂection of a trader’s willingness
to trade.4 In particular, if the trader is a buyer, she will be more eager to buy if she has a
high beta. Conversely, a seller will be more eager to sell if she has a low βt.I no r d e rt os e e
this, assume that the arriving trader is a buyer. Buying the asset yields βtV . She compares
this value with the price in the market and performs the buy if the price is lower than the
value she attaches to the asset. If βt is high, she attaches more weight to consumption on the
second day and hence will be more eager to trade than if βt is low. The reasoning is that the
trading gains are higher in the former case. Similarly, a seller with a low beta will be more
eager to sell since she prefers consumption on the ﬁrst day.
Traders can choose between submitting an order to a dealer market (DM) or to a crossing
network (CN), or not to submit an order at all. We assume competition between dealers on
t h eD Mt ob es u ﬃciently intense such that the spread is one tick, that is A − B =1 ,w i t h
B the bid price and A the ask price. This assumption allows us to focus on the interaction
between markets, abstracting from strategic interactions between dealers. At the same time,
a one-tick spread represents the most competitive position for the DM when competing with
aC N . 5 Dealer bid and ask quotes do not move during the trading day. The implication is
that buyers can always buy at a price A, the price at which a dealer is willing to sell. Sellers
looking for immediacy in the DM obtain B.
4Alternatively, Parlour (1998) argues that βt can be interpreted as a subjective valuation of the asset, or a
p r i o ro v e rt h en e x td a y ’ sa s s e tv a l u eV . Hence, the market is rendered a private values auction, as in Glosten
and Milgrom (1985).
5Bessembinder (2003) ﬁnds average (volume-weighted) quoted spreads on NASDAQ equal to 1.77 cents
(with tick size being 1 cent), which is relatively close to our one-tick assumption. More generally, this “one
tick” should not necessarily be interpreted literally, but rather as a metaphor for the most competitive situation
where competition between dealers has driven the inside spread to its minimum level. As will be shown later,
it is the relative spread that matters for submission strategies of agents. For example, saving the half spread
in the CN is more valuable when the bid is $1 and the ask $1.01, than if they are $100 and $100.01 respectively
(assuming tick size is one cent).
7Next to a DM, we also introduce a CN. We assume that the matching of orders (the
“cross”) takes place at the end of the trading day, that is after the action of the agent
arriving in period T. The price of the cross is derived from the bid and ask in the DM and
equals the midquote (A + B)/2. Given our assumptions, orders at the CN face no price







t > 0( cs
t < 0) represents the cumulative amount of buy (sell) orders at the CN before
the order at time t. After the action of the trader at time t, there are three possible evolutions
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trader t submits no order to CN
. (2)
The ﬁrst two evolutions describe a buy and sell order, respectively. The last case, where
the CN’s order book remains unchanged, stems from a trade at a dealer or from not trading at
all. Once submitted, orders cannot be modiﬁed or cancelled. This means that orders remain in
the CN’s order book until the cross. Order execution is determined by the imbalance between
the queue of buy orders and the queue of sell orders. If cb
T = |cs
T|, meaning no imbalance,
then all orders are executed. If cb
T < |cs
T|, some sell orders cannot be executed. We assume
time priority such that the ﬁrst cb




T| buy orders are executed. It goes without saying that time priority inﬂuences the order
submission strategies of the traders. In practice, some CNs indeed implement a time priority
rule. Examples include the Crossing Session I at the NYSE (rule 904 of SR-NYSE-90-52),
ITG’s POSIT-Now which oﬀers a continuous intraday CN (implicitly granting time priority),
and Xetra XXL employing a volume/time priority rule. Other CNs are often reluctant to
share information on their matching procedure and may use diﬀerent matching procedures
like pro-rata systems.
The above details of the model are common knowledge to traders in the transparency
case we discuss in Section 3. In Section 4, however, we reduce traders’ information sets,
introducing an opaque CN-book and diﬀerent assumptions on the observability of past DM
trades (i.e. partial and complete opaqueness).
83 Equilibrium under Transparency
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium order submission strategies when the CN’s
order book is fully transparent. As a ﬁrst step, we consider successively a DM and a CN
in isolation. This approach allows us to gain insight into the model and the structure and
functioning of each market. Subsequently, we determine the equilibrium when both markets
coexist. The methodology is identical in all cases. For a trader arriving at time t we calculate
ac u t o ﬀ βt at which she is indiﬀerent between two actions, rationally anticipating the impact
of her order on execution probabilities. Furthermore, we develop empirical predictions on
order ﬂow dynamics.
3.1 Dealer Market in Isolation
Suppose for now that there is only a DM. In this case, a trader can choose between submitting
an order to the DM or not trading at all. She will trade at the DM as long as this yields a
positive proﬁt; otherwise she prefers not to trade. When the proﬁti sz e r o ,s h ei si n d i ﬀerent.
Before deciding, she observes the bid and ask in the market, the distribution of β and her
personal βt. The proﬁt of a buy order to the dealer is the diﬀerence between the valuation
of the trader βtV and the price paid A, i.e. the proﬁti sβtV − A. Similarly, for a sell order,













where the ﬁrst superscript refers to buy (b) or sell (s), and the second to the considered
market. This can be interpreted in the following way. A buyer arriving at time t who has a βt
higher than A/V will buy at the DM; all the others will not. When the trader at time t is a
seller, she will sell at the DM if her βt is smaller than B/V. The order submission strategies
are depicted in Figure 1. Note that traders having a βt between B/V and A/V will never
submit an order, regardless of their individual trading orientation.
Please insert Figure 1 around here.
93.2 Crossing Network in Isolation
In this subsection, only a CN is considered (and no DM). To compare the diﬀerent settings,
we assume that the price at which a cross will take place is the midquote as if a DM existed:
(A + B)/2. When arriving at time t, next to this midquote, a trader also observes the overall
distribution of β,h e ro w nβt and the CN order book. She will submit a CN order as long
as this results in a positive expected proﬁt. Now we need to consider expected proﬁts, since
in contrast with an order to a DM, the execution of a CN order may not be certain. If the
order executes, the proﬁt for the trader is the diﬀerence between the trader’s valuation and
the price paid (the midquote). When taking into account the uncertainty about execution,
the expected proﬁt of a CN buy order is p
b,CN
t (βtV − (A + B)/2),w h e r ep
b,CN
t denotes the
expected probability of execution of a CN buy order submitted at time t.F o raC Ns e l lo r d e r ,
the expected proﬁti sp
s,CN
t ((A + B)/2 − βtV ),w i t hp
s,CN
t the probability of execution of
a sell order submitted at time t. These probabilities depend on the book in the CN, and
t h et i m el e f tu n t i lt h ee n do ft h et r a d i n gd a y :p
b,CN
t (ct,T− t) and p
s,CN
t (ct,T− t), but for
notational convenience we suppress this dependence.6 The reasoning for this dependence is
that if a trader joins the longer queue, enough future orders need to be submitted to the
shorter side of the CN’s order book to obtain execution. This is more likely earlier on the
trading day, when there are still a lot of periods to come. Finally, when the expected proﬁt
of a CN order is negative, the trader chooses to abstain, resulting in zero proﬁts.
A trader’s strategy whether or not to submit a CN order is determined by the expected

























. To be complete, these cutoﬀ values hold if the execution probability
is strictly positive. If it is zero, a trader is always indiﬀerent between a CN order and no
order, since both yield zero proﬁt. If this occurs, we assume that traders prefer to abstain.
6Note that, next to the state variables ct and T − t, execution probabilities also depend on F (.), πB and
πS.
10The order submission strategies are summarized in Figure 2. Note that in contrast with a
DM in isolation, there is no “gap”, i.e. there is no range of betas where neither a buyer nor
a seller submits an order. The reasoning is that a CN does not have a spread whereas a DM
is characterized by a one-tick spread.
Please insert Figure 2 around here.
3.3 Coexistence of CN and DM
Having discussed the two trading systems in isolation, we now turn to the full model and
characterize the choice problem faced by a trader arriving in the market at time t.U p o n
arrival, she knows her trading orientation (buyer or seller) and her own βt.M o r e o v e r s h e
observes the bid and ask price of the dealer, the CN order book ct, the distribution of β,t h e
distribution of buyers and sellers and the time remaining to the cross. Recall that the CN
crosses at the midprice of the dealer’s bid and ask. Based on this information, she chooses
between three possible strategies. First, she can initiate a trade at the dealer; such an order
has a guaranteed, immediate execution. Second, she can opt for submitting an order to the
CN. This would yield a better price as it allows the trader to save the half-spread, which in
our model is equal to half a tick. With such an order, however, she might face the risk of
non-execution. Execution is certain when upon arrival she is able to join the shorter queue
(due to time priority in the CN); in all other cases, the execution probability is lower than
one. Third, she can refrain from trading when it yields a negative (expected) proﬁt.
Denote the strategy of a buyer arriving at time t under transparency (tr)b yφb
t,tr (ct,βt)
and of a seller by φs
t,tr (ct,βt) where the notation stresses that the strategy depends on the
time t CN’s order book, ct, and the trader’s type βt. The strategies depend on time and
are non-stationary. The setup of this model can be seen as a stochastic sequential game.
Moreover, due to the recursive nature of the game, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist and
this equilibrium is unique (since traders are indiﬀerent between choices with zero probability).
Applying the approach introduced above to solve the trader’s choice problem, i.e. computing
cutoﬀ values for βt where traders are indiﬀerent between two strategies, Proposition 1 states
the equilibrium strategies of a trader arriving at t.






































t,tr (ct,βt)=1 DM (buy at DM)
. (5)





































t,tr (ct,βt)=0 (no order)
. (6)
Proof. See the Appendix
In the proposition, “1DM” denotes a buy at the DM (which transacts at the ask), and
“−1DM” a sell at the DM (transacting at the bid). Similarly, “1CN”a n d“ −1CN”s t a n df o r
a buy and sell order to the CN, respectively. Employing our one-tick spread assumption,
A − B =1 ,w eﬁnd that the value βt of a buyer who is indiﬀerent between an order to the



































,t h eβt at which a trader is indiﬀerent between a CN buy order and



































































The equilibrium order submission strategies are summarized in Figure 3. Comparing this
graph with Figures 1 and 2, there are some notable diﬀerences. The most important one
is that due to altering execution probabilities the cutoﬀ values become dynamic and change
every period t. For the markets in isolation this was not the case. Moreover, although the
range of β’s at which no buy or sell order is submitted is the same, the ranges at which DM
and CN orders are submitted are, in general, diﬀerent from the isolation cases. Compared
to the DM in isolation, order creation may occur: traders with intermediate β’s now submit
orders to the CN; this allows them to avoid paying the half-spread. Such order creation
eﬀect, induced by the CN, is conﬁrmed empirically by Gresse (2006). The CN also introduces
competition for the DM as it may divert trades away from the DM.7 The welfare implications
of both eﬀects will be discussed in Section 5.
Please insert Figure 3 around here.
It is clear that if the execution probability at the CN increases, an arriving trader is more
likely to opt for a CN order. This execution probability is a crucial element in the choice
between a CN order and a DM trade as it determines expected proﬁts. When trader t submits
a CN order, she changes the imbalance in the CN. This aﬀects the execution probabilities of
future CN orders and hence also the strategies chosen by future traders. When determining
her optimal strategy, trader t must take these eﬀects of her order into account. Proposition
2 shows how the length of the queues (and the imbalance) inﬂuences execution probabilities.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, at any time t, if the CN’s order book at the buy side is one
unit thicker, then the probability of execution of a buy (sell) order will be lower (higher). If
the CN’s order book at the sell side is one unit thicker, then the probability of execution of
a buy (sell) order will be higher (lower). If the book is one unit thicker at the buy side and
one unit thicker at the sell side, then the probability of execution for both order types remains
7Note that this could lead to overall trade creation but also to overall trade reduction. The reasoning for
a potential trade reduction is that some of the investors choosing to trade at the DM, if it were to operate in
isolation, might now opt for the CN at which their order may remain unﬁlled.













































































































































































(both formulations, in terms of probabilities and in terms of betas, are equivalent).
Proof. See the Appendix
Intuitively, Proposition 2 argues that when the queue at one side of the market is longer
when a trader arrives on that side of the market, the execution probabilities of a CN order
are lower relative to when the queue is shorter (parts (i), (iv), and by symmetry (ii) and
(v)). That is, traders face intertemporal competition with traders of their own type. The
reasoning is as follows. Suppose that a buyer arrives at time τ and cb
τ ≥ |cs
τ|.8 Then if
the book is one unit thicker at the buy side, an additional CN order at the sell side must
arrive in order to obtain execution. This lowers the execution probability compared to the
case when the buy queue is one unit shorter (meaning also a smaller imbalance). Only when
both queues are one unit thicker (parts (iii) and (vi)) are execution probabilities not aﬀected




t +0 ,c s
t − 0
¢
-book in terms of execution probabilities and betas. This is in contrast
with a limit order market as in Parlour (1998). In such a market, execution probabilities are
inﬂuenced even when both queues become one unit longer. This proves that in a CN the
imbalance between both queues matters, while in a limit order market the individual length
of both queues is relevant.
3.4 Empirical Predictions on Order Flow Dynamics
Having determined and characterized the equilibrium order submission strategies of traders,
we now investigate order ﬂow patterns in transaction and order ﬂow data resulting from these
strategies. We do so in four propositions. In all cases, we start from a given book in the CN,
8If c
b
τ − 1 < |c
s

















14ct, and from a speciﬁc order, a DM trade or a CN order. We investigate the eﬀect on the
order ﬂow to the DM and the CN in the subsequent period.
We start by assuming that the previous order (at time t) was a DM trade and investigate
the patterns in subsequent order submissions. Proposition 3 then states that the probability
of observing a DM buy does not hinge on whether the previous transaction was a DM buy
or a DM sell.
Proposition 3 The probability of a DM buy at time t+1 is independent of whether the order























A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. Contained in the discussion below.
A similar result holds for CN orders following a DM trade. Proposition 4 shows that the
probability that the current order is a CN order (buy or sell depending on the trader who
arrives) is independent of whether the previous order was a DM sell or a DM buy.
Proposition 4 The probability of a CN buy order at time t +1is equal, whether the order























A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. Contained in the discussion below.
The results in Propositions 3 and 4 are driven by the same intuition. If the previous order
was a DM trade, none of the elements determining the current trader’s strategy — such as
her beta, the CN-book or the execution probability — are inﬂuenced diﬀerently whether the
order was a DM buy or a DM sell. These results are in sharp contrast with models of limit
order markets, such as Parlour (1998). In her model, market orders (comparable to our DM
15trades) do inﬂuence the probabilities of subsequent orders, as they change the depth in the
limit order book and hence the execution probabilities of subsequent limit orders.
The conclusions alter, however, when we assume that the order at time t was a CN order
instead of a DM trade. In this case, we obtain systematic patterns in order ﬂow despite the
fact that buyers and sellers arrive randomly. Proposition 5 shows that when the trader at
time t has chosen a CN buy order, it is less likely that a buyer at t +1will do the same,
compared to when trader t did not submit a CN buy order.
Proposition 5 The probability of a CN buy order at time t +1is smaller if the order at
time t was a CN buy order than if it was a DM trade (buy or sell). This in turn is smaller



































A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. See the Appendix
Complementary to Proposition 5, Proposition 6 shows that it becomes more likely that
the current buyer submits a DM buy if the previous order was a CN buy order, than if it was
another type of order.
Proposition 6 The probability of a DM buy at time t +1is greater if the order at time t
was a CN buy order than if it was a DM trade (buy or sell). This in turn is greater than the


































A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
16Proof. See Appendix
The intuition behind Propositions 5 and 6 is as follows. Assume that the time t +1
trader is a buyer. If the queue of buy orders at time t +1is shorter than the sell queue,
the equality sign applies, since the execution probability of a submitted CN buy order equals
one. In this case, the type of the previous order is irrelevant for the current order ﬂow. In
contrast, if after the order of the trader at t the buy queue is longer than the sell queue, i.e.
when there is an unfavorable imbalance for the time t +1buyer, the type of the previous
order does matter. Given her βt+1, the current trader will be more likely to submit a CN
buy order if the previous order increased the execution probability. This is the case when
the unfavorable imbalance in the CN’s order book decreases, which happens after a CN sell
order in the previous period. A DM trade (be it buy or sell) does not alter the imbalance,
while a CN buy order at t even increases the imbalance. Symmetrically, if trader t+1is less
likely to submit a CN order, she will be more likely to opt for an order to the dealer.
Propositions 5 and 6 demonstrate the existence of systematic patterns in order ﬂow. This
ﬁnding is of importance to empirical researchers. In general, the literature tends to attribute
such patterns to informed trading, whereas our model shows that these can also stem from
the interaction between two trading venues. For example, a series of consecutive buy trades
at the DM need not imply that some traders have private information; it might result from
an unfavorable imbalance in the CN-book for the buyer. Thus, empirical research focusing on
patterns in DM order ﬂow (while neglecting the CN) might point to wrong conclusions. An
interesting empirical application of our model would therefore be to determine the importance
of this interaction eﬀect in explaining order ﬂow patterns relative to other factors.
Furthermore, it is worth stressing that although the patterns outlined in Propositions
5 and 6 are similar to the case of a limit order market in Parlour (1998), the underlying
dynamics are very diﬀerent. As argued before, in the case of a limit order market, the length
of the queues at bid and ask are important and both market and limit orders have an eﬀect.
In our model, with a DM and a CN, it is the imbalance between buy and sell queues in the
CN that is relevant, and this imbalance is inﬂuenced only by CN orders, not by DM trades.
Finally, note that the CN in our model also exhibits two opposing externalities as in Hen-
dershott and Mendelson (2000). On the one hand, a positive (liquidity) externality prevails
on the CN as adding an order is beneﬁcial to traders arriving in the future; hence increasing
liquidity attracts additional liquidity. On the other hand, there is a negative (crowding) exter-
17nality as early arriving low liquidity value traders may preempt higher liquidity value traders
arriving later in the trading day. Hence, these externalities as identiﬁed by Hendershott
and Mendelson also hold in a dynamic context with sequentially instead of simultaneously
arriving traders.
4 Equilibrium under Opaqueness
In Proposition 1, traders condition their strategies on past order ﬂow and the resulting visible
CN-book.9 As argued in the introduction however, most CNs are rather opaque and do not
actively disseminate information on their order book. In this section, we adapt our model
to capture opaqueness. We deal with two degrees of opaqueness, “complete” and “partial”,
and contrast these to the transparency case. Other models of CNs such as Hendershott and
Mendelson (2000) or Dönges and Heinemann (2006) cannot compare diﬀerent informational
settings, as they deal with simultaneous order submissions.
4.1 Complete Opaqueness
Complete opaqueness implies that a trader no longer observes past DM trades and past CN
order ﬂow. However, she still knows her βt and trading orientation, the time of the cross T,
the distribution F (β), πB and πS. In order to condition her strategy on the CN-book, ct,
she needs to form expectations about it. She does so in two steps. First, she is able to solve
any past trader’s optimization problem. Combining this with the common knowledge on the
distributions for F (β), πB and πS in a second step allows her to compute the expected CN-
book at t. Formally, let =t,co denote the time t trader’s information set, where the subscript
“co” refers to complete opaqueness, and let E (ct|=t,co) be the expected CN-book. Based on
this expected CN-book and the time left until the cross, she computes the expected execution
probability of a CN order, which we denote by pb
t,co (E (ct|=t,co),T− t) if she is a buyer, and
by ps
t,co (E (ct|=t,co),T− t) if she is a seller.10 As in Section 3, we suppress the dependence
for notational convenience and denote them in short by pb
t,co and ps
t,co, respectively. Based on



























for a seller.11 Now denote the optimal strategy of a buyer
9Other elements in the information set are the distribution of β, their individual βt, the time left until the
cross, traders’ distributions at both market sides and their own trading orientation.
10Clearly, to derive these probabilities, as in the transparency case, she needs to solve future arriving traders’
choice problems.
11Note that the notation of these cutoﬀ values is analogous to that in Section 3.
18arriving at t as φb
t,co (E (ct|=t,co),βt),a n dt h a to fas e l l e rb yφs
t,co (E (ct|=t,co),βt).I ti st h e n
possible to reformulate Proposition 1 for the complete opaqueness case by replacing the cutoﬀ
betas and strategies with their respective counterparts, deﬁned in the current section. This
modiﬁed Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium order submission strategies of traders in
a complete opaqueness setting.
With complete opaqueness, later arriving traders do not observe previous traders’ strate-
gies and also anticipate their own decision is not revealed to subsequent traders. Traders’
decisions then become independent from past orders, and each arriving trader decides only
using information on her βt, on general predictions about past and future traders’ behavior
and the resulting expected CN order book. Therefore, and in contrast to the transparency
case, empirical work that ex-post observes the diﬀerent decisions of investors should not ﬁnd
path-dependency.
4.2 Partial Opaqueness
Under “partial” opaqueness, traders do observe previous DM trades, but do neither observe
CN order ﬂow, nor do they have information on the CN-book. This informational environment
corresponds closest to reality as DMs are in general transparent while CNs are rather opaque.
At i m et trader thus observes in each past period either a DM buy, a DM sell, or no trade
at the DM. In the latter case, she does not know whether a CN buy, a CN sell or no order
was submitted. Nevertheless, her information set is now clearly richer than under complete
opaqueness. Let =t,po denote this extended information set, where the subscript “po” refers
to partial opaqueness. =t,po is thus equal to =t,co plus observed DM trades. Based on =t,po,
she is now able to form more precise expectations about the time t CN-book E (ct|=t,po) or in
short Et,po (ct). In turn, the determination of this expected CN-book allows her to compute
the expected execution probability of a CN order, which we denote by pb
t,po (Et,po (ct),T− t)
for a buy order, and by ps




























she is a seller. Note that, in contrast to the complete opaqueness case, these cutoﬀ betas
exhibit path-dependency.12 In other words, they hinge on past traders’ decisions which
are now partly observed. The resulting optimal strategy for the time t trader is denoted by
φb
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt) for a buyer and φs
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt) for a seller. Reformulating Proposition
12Clearly, however, the cutoﬀ betas under transparency and partial opaqueness are in general not equal,
because the information sets of the trader at time t diﬀer in both cases.
191 for this partial opaqueness case characterizes the traders’ equilibrium order submission
strategies within this setting.
Propositions 5 and 6 demonstrated the existence of systematic patterns in order ﬂow under
transparency. The question arises whether these patterns extend to the partial opaqueness
case. Propositions 7 and 8 reveal that the answer is ambiguous. Systematic patterns do also
arise under partial opaqueness, but their nature is diﬀerent from those under transparency.
More speciﬁcally, Proposition 7 shows that the probability of a CN buy order after observing
a DM trade can be smaller, equal or larger than after observing no order. As shown in the
proofs, the resulting patterns depend on the probabilities the trader at t+1assigns to a CN
b u y ,C Ns e l lo rn oo r d e ra tt and on her expectations of the CN book, which in turn depend
on the distribution of types F (.) and the fraction of buyers and sellers in the market πS and
πB.
Proposition 7 The probability of a CN buy order at t +1if the order at t was an observed
DM trade (buy or sell) can be smaller, equal or larger compared to if no order was observed at
t (i.e. φs
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=−1CN or φb
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=1 CN or φb
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=0
or φs









t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=1 DM
or φs
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=−1DM,E t,po (ct)
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=1 CN|no order observed,E t,po (ct)
i
. (16)
A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. See the Appendix
Complementary to Proposition 7, Proposition 8 reveals that it can become more, equally
or less likely that the current buyer submits a DM buy if the previous order was a DM trade,
than if it was another type of order.
Proposition 8 The probability of a DM buy at t+1if a DM trade was observed at t can be
smaller, equal or larger compared to if no order was observed at t (i.e. φs
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=
20−1CN or φb
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=1 CN or φb
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=0or φs









t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=1 DM
or φs
t,po (Et,po (ct),βt)=−1DM,E t,po (ct)
¤








=1 DM|no order observed,E t,po (ct)
i
. (17)
A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. See the Appendix
Propositions 7 and 8 thus show that systematic patterns in order ﬂow under partial
opaqueness may change over time and work in two directions. The intuition for this ﬁnding
is that observing no order relative to a DM-trade may be “good” news or “bad” news for
a successive CN order. It is good news as observing no order may reveal the addition of
counterparties. It is “bad” news when the observation of no order suggests that an interesting
opportunity at a CN may have been preempted. This result is in contrast with the patterns
in the transparency case which were unambiguously determined. In other words, we ﬁnd that
the CN’s transparency plays an important role for order ﬂow patterns to both the CN and
the DM. Changing this institutional property of the CN may therefore impact order ﬂow.
5W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
We now introduce formal welfare deﬁnitions and characterize ex ante welfare for the diﬀerent
settings. The ex ante welfare measures we develop build on rational trader behavior. They are
therefore identical to the “average” realized ex post welfare. We consider two complementary
welfare measures. The ﬁrst captures overall welfare, OW, and takes into account all agents’
expected gains from trade. That is, the sum of all agents’ expected utilities from trading
(see Glosten (1998), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), or Holliﬁeld, Miller, Sandas and
Slive (2006) for a similar approach in deﬁning gains from trade). In our setting, OW includes
both trader welfare and dealer welfare. Our second measure focuses on trader welfare, TW,
from an ex ante standpoint, as in Viswanathan and Wang (2002). TW and OW diﬀer only
because OW does take into account dealer welfare.
We ﬁrst consider each of the isolation cases separately and compare them in a next step.
21Changes in the degree of transparency leave welfare unaﬀected when considering a trading
system in isolation as they do not inﬂuence order submission behavior. Finally, we turn to
the coexistence of trading systems and highlight the welfare implications of diﬀerent degrees
of opaqueness.
5.1 Markets in Isolation
5.1.1 Dealer Market
With a DM in isolation, all submitted orders result in trades. However, an important inef-
ﬁciency is that some traders refrain from submitting orders: only high valuation buyers and
sellers are prepared to incur the half-spread. Overall welfare at the DM, OWDM, and trader
welfare at the DM, TWDM,d i ﬀer from each other due to dealer welfare. To evaluate dealer
welfare, we procure dealers with a time-invariant βDM, such that they set bid and ask prices
A and B around V .13 Formally, OWDM and TWDM then become:14
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t represent overall and trader welfare in period t, respectively.
Buyers with βt ≤ A
V and sellers with βt ≥ B
V do not submit orders (see also Figure 1).
Sellers receive a price B from dealers whereas buyers pay a price A to dealers. Dealers
value the stock at βDMV . Prices are simple transfers between traders and dealers. They
do aﬀect, however, the participation of traders. Notice that both OWDM and TWDM are
linear in the number of periods T, i.e. adding more periods proportionally increases both
welfare measures. Hence, period t welfare, OWDM
t and TWDM
t , is constant over all periods
t, implying it is always equal to average per-period welfare which we denote as OW
DM and
13Later on, in our explicit solutions, we will assume “symmetry” for all parameters such that βDM =1 .
This implies that dealers are assumed to have a median β.
14Strictly speaking, OW
DM and TW
DM depend also on the length of the trading day T, but we suppress
this for notational convenience.
22TW
DM,i . e .OW









Trader and overall welfare are identical at a CN in isolation, as gains from trade go to traders
only. Our two welfare measures therefore coincide and we label them as WCN.A l l b u y e r s
with βt ≥ A+B
2V and sellers with βt ≤ A+B
2V submit orders (see Figure 2), but these orders may
not always result in trades which represents an ineﬃciency of the CN. Also, trades execute
at the midprice (which equals (A+B)/2). Again, prices simply represent transfers from one
trader to another but prices determine traders’ participation.
In computing welfare, we now need to take the weighted average over all states that can
o c c u ri ne a c hp e r i o dt. For instance with transparency, in period 2 we have three possible
states as the CN-book can be (-1,0), (0,0) or (0,1) depending on whether in period 1 aC Ns e l l ,
no order, or a CN buy order was submitted, respectively. Each state has its own execution
probabilities. Therefore, denote the set of all possible states in period t with a CN in isolation
as ΩCN
t , and an element of this set ΩCN
t as ωCN
t . The probability that state ωCN
t occurs in
period t is αCN















































Hence, we take a weighted average over all possible states and compute the state-contingent
execution probabilities and welfare, which is necessary to compute expected ex ante welfare.
Note that we did not need this notation in Section 3 as we there started from a given state
at time t (which is then part of the information set of a trader) and analyzed cutoﬀ betas
and resulting order ﬂow patterns conditional on this state.
It is interesting to remark that WCN increases more than proportionally in the number
15The displayed formula for W
CN applies for transparency, where several states with associated probabilities
are possible. Remark, however, that with a transparent CN book, the cutoﬀ betas are equal to
A+B
2V for all
possible states. When the CN book is opaque, Ω
CN
t reduces to a single state where the cutoﬀ beta also equals
A+B
2V . Therefore, W
CN is identical for transparency and opaqueness.
23of periods T. The intuition for this result is that a higher number of periods T produces
positive liquidity externalities on the average execution probabilities.
5.1.3 Comparing Markets in Isolation
A comparison of the two markets in isolation shows that each of them exhibits one type of











only participate in the CN. On the other
hand, the DM oﬀers certainty of execution (but charges the half-spread for this service), while
orders at a CN only execute when counterparties appear.




the DM is better for lower T and higher V , i.e. with shorter trading days and for assets
with a higher underlying value (or lower relative spread). We illustrate this ﬁnding assuming
a uniform distribution for β over [0.8,1.2], πB =0 .5, A+B
2 = V ,a n dβDM =1 .I n F i g u r e
4, we display the average per-period welfare OW
DM, TW
DM and W
CN for diﬀerent values
of T (i.e. 1 to 8) as a function of V . As indicated before, both OW
DM and TW
DM are
invariant to changes in T. In contrast, W
CN increases in T:t h e l a r g e r T,t h el a r g e rt h e
execution probability of submitted orders due to the liquidity externality. Indeed, we observe
that W
CN is lower than OW
DM and TW
DM for low T and high V . The positive diﬀerence
between OW
DM and TW
DM reﬂects dealers proﬁt s . N o t et h a tb o t hOW
DM and TW
DM
start at 0 for V ≤ 2.5 as the spread then prices the DM out of the market.
Please insert Figure 4 around here.
As a prelude to the welfare discussion when markets coexist, we highlight that all forces
driving our results when comparing markets in isolation are already at work for small T,i . e .
T ≤ 4.
Further, we also ﬁnd some heterogeneous intertemporal eﬀects, i.e. diﬀerences over peri-
ods t (results not displayed for brevity): the CN is more interesting for early arriving traders
than for later arriving traders as WCN
t decreases in t. This result stems from time priority.
In particular, traders arriving early are better oﬀ as they “preempt” later arriving competing
traders. Hence, per-period welfare decreases over time, or WCN
t ≤ WCN
t+i , for all i>0,a s
24the execution probabilities drop in t. In contrast, per-period welfare at the DM, OWDM
t and
TWDM
t ,a r et−invariant.
Do note that traders with diﬀerent βt may not necessarily agree on the ranking of trading
systems as the ranking mentioned above holds for the “average” trader. From an ex ante
perspective, traders with an “extreme” βt tend to prefer the DM whereas traders with a
“intermediate” βt tend to prefer the CN. This will prove to be important for our welfare
considerations when traders have the choice between trading systems presented in the next
subsection.
5.2 Coexistence of Markets
In the remainder of this section, we analyze ex ante welfare when traders endogenously route
their orders to the system maximizing their individual expected gains from trade. We also
investigate how the degree of transparency at both trading systems impacts ex ante welfare.
To this end, we ﬁrst formally deﬁne for each informational setting ex ante overall welfare
a n dt r a d e rw e l f a r e .I ne x p l i c i t l ys o l v i n ga n di llustrating the implications of a change in the
informational setting, we ﬁrst present the results for T =3 . In a subsequent robustness
section, we highlight the additional insights stemming from T ranging between 2 and 4.
Adding more periods only strongly complexiﬁes the calculations. Based on our isolation
cases, we expect, however, that adding more periods does not add much value as the most
important insights in the isolation cases were already identiﬁed for T ≤ 4.
We display the results for the average per-period welfare but discuss the period-speciﬁc
welfare results when they bring new insights. T h i sa n a l y s i sa l l o w su st oe x p l o r ew h e t h e r
adding a CN could improve on a DM from a trader welfare and an overall welfare perspec-
tive, i.e. whether the coexistence of a CN and a DM yields welfare gains relative to a DM in
isolation, and how the degree of transparency aﬀects ex ante welfare. Throughout the illus-




=[ 0 .8,1.2].F u r t h e r ,V ranges from 2.5 to 10 and the one-tick spread is assumed to be
symmetrically positioned around V (i.e. A = V + 1
2 and B = V − 1
2), implying that A+B
2 = V .
5.2.1 Formal Deﬁnition of Welfare under Coexistence
We ﬁrst proceed by presenting formal welfare deﬁnitions for the three informational settings
under coexistence. Denote the set of all possible states in period t with coexistence between
25CN and DM for informational setting i (with i = tr,co,po)a sΩt,i, and an element of Ωt,i by
ωt,i. The probability that state ωt,i occurs in period t is αωt,i,t h ec u t o ﬀ betas between CN
and DM in a particular state are ¯ β
b
ωt,i and βs
ωt,i, and the associated probabilities of execution
at the CN, pb
ωt,i and ps
ωt,i. Important to stress is that the set of states Ωt,tr, Ωt,co and Ωt,po
are diﬀerent from each other. This can easily be seen by noting that e.g. in period 2, under
transparency we have three possible states (i.e. a CN book equal to (-1,0), (0,0) or (0,1)),
while under complete opaqueness we only have one state (as nothing is observed after period
1). Finally, for partial opaqueness, two possible states exist: either a trader observed a DM
order in period 1 (in this case she knows the book is (0,0)), or she observed nothing.16
Under coexistence of a CN and a DM, ex ante trader welfare, TWCN−DM,i,a n do v e r a l l

























































16Note that we did not need this more complex notation in Sections 3 and 4, when analyzing order ﬂow
patterns. In these sections, we started from a given state in period t, and computed the cutoﬀ betas for this
state. In the current Section 5, we now compute ex ante welfare and need to consider all possible states in
period t. Therefore, we stress this by using ωt,i. In other words, e.g. ¯ β
b
t,tr in Section 3 is just short-hand
notation for ¯ β
b






















































(βDMV − βtV )f (βt)dβt
#
. (21)
With transparency (i = tr), traders rationally expect to be fully informed about previous
traders’ decisions when deciding where to route their order. Further, when both markets are
completely opaque (i = co), later arriving traders anticipate they will not learn over time but
know that orders by earlier arriving traders may have been submitted inﬂuencing their order
submission strategies. Finally, with partial opaqueness (i = po), traders expect to learn over
time whether orders have been submitted to the DM or not. This inﬂuences traders’ order
submission strategies and execution probabilities.
5.2.2 Comparing Coexistence: the Impact of Opaqueness
Figure 5 displays the impact of coexistence for the three informational settings on average
per-period trader welfare and overall welfare. It considers the results for T =3 .
Please insert Figure 5 around here.
Trader Welfare In a ﬁrst step, we purely focus on average per-period trader welfare for the
three informational settings, TW
CN−DM,tr, TW
CN−DM,po,a n dTW
CN−DM,co,a n dc o m p a r e
those with TW
DM. We obtain two main results. First, coexistence produces greater average
trader welfare than the DM in isolation. Second, a greater degree of transparency increases






Figure 5 illustrates those two main results but remark that we do not display TW
CN−DM,co
as the diﬀerences with TW
CN−DM,po are small which causes both to visually almost coincide.
We, however, elaborate on the diﬀerences between complete and partial opaqueness in Figure
6.
What drives these two results on trader welfare? It is clear that coexistence induces both
order creation and trade diversion. The individual magnitude of these two eﬀects determines
their joint impact on welfare relative to TW
DM. Order creation relative to the DM-only case











which only execute when counterparties appear. Through the execution of these orders,
order creation translates into trade creation which leads to an identical increase in average
overall and trader welfare. We label this as the “TW order creation eﬀect” or the “OW
order creation eﬀect”. It is important to remark that the size of this eﬀect is diﬀerent for
the three informational settings as the execution probabilities of the created orders diﬀer
across these settings. As towards trade diversion, from a buyer perspective, we can show
that trader welfare in a given state ωt,i increases in ¯ β
b
ωt,i as long as there is no “complete”













≥ 0 for i = tr,co,po.N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,
that when trade diversion is complete (i.e. when ¯ β
b
ωt,i = ¯ β), the impact on trader welfare still
varies in the execution probabilities. That is, given complete trade diversion, an increase in
the CN’s execution probability pb
ωt,i improves trader welfare within state ωt,i.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
it is impossible to provide a generally valid ranking of trader welfare that is uniquely based
on the cutoﬀ betas, ¯ β
b
ωt,i and βs
ωt,i, or on a state-weighted average of these cutoﬀ betas. To
accommodate this issue, we construct a welfare statistic that quantiﬁes the impact of trade
d i v e r s i o no nt r a d e rw e l f a r ew h i c hw el a b e l“TW trade diversion eﬀect”.T h i se ﬀect measures
the impact on trader welfare relative to TW
DM of all traders that would have gone to the
DM in isolation. More speciﬁcally, the “TW trade diversion eﬀect” is due to traders that
divert from a (hypothetical) DM in isolation to a CN. Combined, the “TW order creation
eﬀect” and the “TW trade diversion eﬀect” make up the diﬀerence between TW
CN−DM,i and
TW
DMfor each informational setting i.17 Formally, both concepts are deﬁned as follows:
17Note that the “TW order creation eﬀect” in fact hinges on the degree of trade diversion. The reasoning
is that the degree of trade diversion determines the expected execution probability at the CN.




















































































We display the “TW order creation eﬀect” and the “TW trade diversion eﬀect” for the
three informational settings in Figure 6. We observe that both eﬀects are positive and largest
for transparency, thus conﬁrming the results of Figure 5. The “TW order creation eﬀect” is
considerable for low V as it entails the impact on trader welfare of a substantial set of traders.
In particular, for V =2 .5,t h e“ TW order creation eﬀect” completely explains TW
CN−DM,i
as TW
DM then equals zero. For higher V ,t h e“ TW order creation eﬀect” tends towards
zero as the order creation induced by the CN becomes relatively less important due to the
lowering relative spread. Further, the “TW order creation eﬀect” increases in the degree
of transparency (see below for an explanation). Focusing next on the “TW trade diversion
eﬀect”, w eo b s e r v ei ti n c r e a s e si nV at ﬁrst. This is due to a substantial set of traders diverting
t ot h eC Na tl o wl e v e l so fV . These traders’ welfare gains relative to the DM in isolation
increase in V within this region. For larger V ,h o w e v e r ,t h e“ TW trade diversion eﬀect” starts
to decrease as the DM becomes more attractive and fewer traders divert to the CN. Also the
“TW trade diversion eﬀect” increases in the degree of transparency. Hence, completely
transparent markets are most beneﬁcial to both segments of traders, the CN-only traders
29and the traders that would trade in a DM in isolation. The reasoning is that transparency
invites order ﬂow to the CN which will be hit by counterparties leading to greater execution
probabilities. This stimulates the “TW order creation eﬀect” and the “TW trade diversion
eﬀect”. As argued before, at higher values of V both eﬀects gradually decrease due to the fact
that the DM in isolation is already quite competitive by its decreasing relative spread. Still,
transparency performs better than the opaqueness settings. Hence, having a transparent
CN book positively aﬀects trader welfare: it induces a higher degree of trade diversion,
generates on average larger execution probabilities and thus keeps the CN competitive for a
broader range of V .18 Further, from Figure 6, we learn that partial opaqueness performs only
slightly better than complete opaqueness. The reasoning for these small diﬀerences is that
the degree of trade diversion is only slightly larger for partial opaqueness than for complete
opaqueness, leading to quite similar execution probabilities, which also implies that the “TW
order creation eﬀect” is comparable. Even though traders obtain some information about
order ﬂow when markets are partially opaque, their welfare only increases marginally as they
do not learn the “direction” of the order ﬂow.
Please insert Figure 6 around here.
An interesting question is on which market traders generate their welfare when trading
systems coexist. To highlight the merits of each market, Figure 7 splits TW
CN−DM,i up
into welfare stemming from the CN and the DM. This ﬁgure only displays the results for
partial opaqueness and transparency, as partial and complete opaqueness visually almost
would coincide. As expected, we observe that trader welfare from the DM is larger than from
the CN for higher V . Also trader welfare from the DM increases in V .F i g u r e5s h o w e dt h a t
trader welfare, summed up over both markets, is highest with transparency. However, Figure
7 reveals that heterogeneity arises. For low values of V , trader welfare from the DM is higher
with transparency. For higher V , less traders decide to go to the DM when markets are
transparent. Trader welfare stemming from the CN in general is higher with transparency.
Figure 7 also shows that in terms of trader welfare, the CN performs better than the DM for
low V and vice versa.
18We also perform a per-period analysis (i.e. for t =1 ,2 or 3), and ﬁnd that transparency produces the
greatest trader welfare in every period.
30Please insert Figure 7 around here.
Overall Welfare Next, we shift our focus to average per-period overall welfare for the
three informational settings, OW
CN−DM,tr,OW
CN−DM,co and OW
CN−DM,po.T h e r e s u l t s
are displayed in Figure 5, again OW
CN−DM,co is not included as it visually almost coincides
with OW
CN−DM,po. We observe two main results. First, overall welfare of a DM in isolation,
OW
DM, outranks all coexistence settings, except for low values of V . Second, and in contrast
to trader welfare, transparency only yields higher average overall welfare than opaqueness for
low values of V .I n d e e d ,w en o t i c ei nF i g u r e5t h a tOW
CN−DM,po and OW
CN−DM,tr intersect
for V around 7.5.
How to explain these results? The main force driving these ﬁndings is the potentially
negative impact of trade diversion on dealer welfare when markets coexist. While diverted
trades imply with certainty that dealers do not earn the spread, they only yield additional
trader welfare for the executed part of the CN order ﬂow. As such, coexistence performs
better than the DM in isolation case when the loss in dealer welfare (induced by trade
diversion) is more than compensated by additional trader welfare (induced by trade diversion
and order creation). As towards this last component, recall from our trader welfare analysis
that coexistence compared to the DM in isolation case creates two eﬀects. While diverted
trades positively aﬀect the “OW or TW order creation eﬀect” (both are identical) and the
“TW trade diversion eﬀect”, they harm dealer welfare. The sum of the “TW trade diversion
eﬀect” and the loss in dealer welfare relative to a DM in isolation constitutes the “OW trade
diversion eﬀect”. This “OW trade diversion eﬀect” is always negative and exhibits a non-
linear structure as it hinges on the degree of trade diversion and the execution probabilities
at the CN. To illustrate this non-linearity, note that, from a buyer perspective and for a given
state, we have that the “OW trade diversion eﬀect” becomes more negative in ¯ β
b
ωt,i as long
as trade diversion is not complete. However, when trade diversion is complete, or ¯ β
b
ωt,i = ¯ β,
then it is easy to see that the “OW trade diversion eﬀect” actually becomes less negative in
the execution probabilities at the CN. When the execution probabilities at the CN are one,
the “OW trade diversion eﬀect” reaches its maximum level of zero.
T h es u mo ft h ep o s i t i v e“OW order creation eﬀect” and negative (but non-linear) “OW
trade diversion eﬀect” determines the impact of coexistence and the degree of opaqueness
on overall welfare. This drives our two main results on overall welfare identiﬁed above. Our
31ﬁrst result is that coexistence only leads to higher welfare than a DM in isolation for low V :
the “OW order creation eﬀect” then dominates the modestly negative “OW trade diversion
eﬀect” since execution probabilities at the CN are quite high. The opposite holds for higher
V . The second result is that OW
CN−DM,tr is larger than OW
CN−DM,po only for low V :i n
this region transparency induces either complete trade diversion with high execution proba-
bilities in certain states or no trade diversion at all in other states, whereas opaqueness tends
more towards intermediate trade diversion combined with lower execution probabilities. The
opposite holds for higher V , where transparency seems to induce substantial trade diversion
combined with relatively low execution probabilities. Finally, we also observe in Figure 5 that
OW
CN−DM,po exactly equals TW
CN−DM,po for low values of V . This implies that complete
trade diversion occurs in all possible states and periods. For transparency, however, overall
welfare always outranks trader welfare. In this setting, in some later periods, some states
render a zero execution probability to the arriving trader implying no trade diversion and
higher overall welfare.
Finally, our per-period analysis reveals some interesting heterogeneity when consider-
ing the diﬀerent periods t within the trading day (results not displayed). We ﬁnd that
OWCN−DM
3 under transparency is larger than with opaqueness for all values of V as traders
take fully informed decisions under transparency. In period 1, however, both opaqueness
settings perform better than transparency.
Robustness checks, extensions and summary In this last subsection, we elaborate on
some robustness checks and extensions. First, our results remain qualitatively unaﬀected by
variations in the beta support (to e.g. [0.7,1.3] or [0.6,1.4]). The impact of order creation
naturally becomes less important when the distribution widens. Also, some traders exhibit
a higher willingness to pay for a DM, such that coexistence adds less to welfare.
Second, Figure 8 displays the results for trader welfare for T =2to 4 and shows that our
main ﬁndings as discussed for T =3continue to hold. Indeed, we observe that transparency
oﬀers the highest average per-period trader welfare for every T, which is in line with the results
shown in Figure 5. In addition, we learn that average per-period trader welfare increases in
T. This result is reminiscent of our ﬁndings for the welfare on the CN in isolation case. The
intuition is that the execution probabilities at the CN increase in T. Further, our previously
discussed results on overall welfare as depicted in Figure 5 also remain valid when considering
32T =2to 4 (results not displayed for brevity).
Please insert Figure 8 around here.
Third, our analysis provides insights on the question whether CNs should opt to become
more transparent or not. We will consider the answer to this question with respect to two
diﬀerent goals that could potentially be set by the CN. One view is that a CN aims to
maximize the welfare of those trading on its system. Figure 7 shows that in general trader
welfare from trading at the CN is greater when it is transparent. Another view is that a CN
aims to maximize the number of trades on its system, for example, because it charges a ﬁxed
fee per transaction. Note that the number of trades may not be a good proxy for welfare as
typically only agents with “intermediate” β trade at the CN, whereas agents with “extreme”
β trade at the DM. In undisplayed exercises, we ﬁnd that the number of trades at the CN
is largest when the CN is transparent. While typically CNs are quite opaque, recently, we
indeed observe that some CNs have become more transparent. Examples includes BIDS and
ITG’s POSIT-Now with BLOCKalert, which reveal the arrival of potential counterparties to
the investor community.
Finally, while our analysis so far assumed that traders submit one-unit orders, in practice
traders may have multiple units to trade. Consider now the setting where traders may have
single or multiple units to trade. Two cases can be considered. The ﬁrst is where the traders’
choice of trading system is made before knowing their order size (as in Viswanathan and
Wang (2002)). This implies that orders can not be split such that our main ﬁndings are
only aﬀected in a rather straightforward way (i.e. larger orders aﬀect execution probabilities
and therefore the choice between CN and DM). The second case is where traders that have
a multiple unit order can engage in order splitting as in the extension of Parlour (1998) to
multiple units. In our setting, order splitting implies choosing for diﬀerent trading systems.
This case is highly more complex as the state space expands dramatically as some traders may
have one unit whereas others multiple units. To identify the impact of multiple units and the
potential issue of order splitting, consider a stylized two-period case with all traders exposed
to identical multiple-unit orders. We argue that most of our results remain unaﬀected for
transparency and complete opaqueness as traders are risk neutral. More speciﬁcally, with
transparent markets traders’ order submission strategies will not change compared to our
33base case settings. The reasoning is that it is always optimal for a ﬁrst-period buyer or seller
with a given βt to put the entire multiple-unit order either on the CN or the DM. Her decision
is unaﬀected as the order is publicly revealed and the “good” counterparty will ﬁnd it optimal
to take either the entire order or no unit at all. With complete opaqueness, equivalently, the
traders’ strategies are unaﬀected by order size due to risk neutrality. Technically, the system
of equations to be solved is independent from trade size. With partial opaqueness, however,
traders might ﬁnd it interesting to submit one order to the DM and route the remainder
to the CN. In this way they “reveal” that orders were submitted to the CN. The results of
partial opaqueness then could be expected become closer to those of transparency.
In summary, our welfare analysis shows that when comparing markets in isolation, a DM
oﬀers both greater trader and overall welfare than a CN for low T and high V .C o e x i s t e n c e
of markets leads to greater trader welfare than a system in isolation due to the widening of
traders’ opportunity sets. The impact of coexistence on trader welfare is more pronounced
at lower values of V . For higher values of V , though, coexistence adds less in terms of trader
welfare reﬂecting the fact that traders opt for the DM when the “spread eﬀect” becomes
relatively less important. Coexistence, however, may decrease overall welfare compared to
a DM in isolation as trade diversion decreases dealers’ proﬁts. Also, a greater degree of
transparency unambiguously increases trader welfare as traders anticipate their orders will
be revealed to potential counterparties. The impact of the degree of transparency on overall
welfare depends on the asset value V and the associated relative spread. When V is low,
transparency ranks better than both opaqueness settings. This result reverses, however, when
V is high.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a dynamic microstructure model to study the interaction between two
trading systems. We study the competition between a crossing network (CN) and a dealer
market (DM) within three diﬀerent informational environments. In particular, a transparency
setting where agents have full information on the CN’s order book and DM trades is con-
trasted to two opaqueness settings. Under “complete” opaqueness, traders do not have any
information on the CN’s order book, nor on DM trades, while with “partial” opaqueness they
observe only DM trades, but not order ﬂow to the CN. In practice, CNs are indeed quite
34opaque as they often prevent traders from observing the CN’s order book.
We ﬁnd that introducing a CN next to a DM generates two eﬀects on order ﬂow. First,
it leads to “order creation” as the CN attracts investors who would refrain from trading in
the absence of a CN. The reasoning is that traders can save the half-spread when trading at
the CN, making the submission of a CN order proﬁtable for these investors. Second, some
orders by relatively low willingness to trade agents trading on the DM are now diverted to
the CN. This “trade diversion” induces competition for the DM.
We also show that the execution probability at a CN is endogenous. It depends on the
state of the CN’s order book (if transparent), the observed order ﬂow, and the expectation
of past and future orders. Thus, although we start from dealers willing to provide liquidity
at exogenously given bid and ask prices, we partly endogenize liquidity supply and demand
by looking at traders submitting orders for potential execution at a CN. Our dynamic model
displays two externalities on the CN as documented in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000),
who consider competition between a DM and a CN in a static game with simultaneous order
submissions. On the one hand, the CN is characterized by a positive (liquidity) externality
as adding a CN buy (sell) order is beneﬁcial to future CN sellers (buyers). On the other hand,
a CN exhibits a negative (crowding) externality as investors with a low willingness to trade
who arrive early in the trading day may preempt investors with a higher willingness to trade
who arrive later.
Our welfare results can be summarized as follows. First, when comparing markets in
isolation, we ﬁnd that a DM oﬀers both greater trader and overall welfare than a CN when
the execution probability at the CN and the relative spread are low. Second, order creation
and trade diversion determine the impact of coexistence of trading systems and the degree of
transparency on welfare. Coexistence of trading systems leads to greater trader welfare but
may decrease overall welfare compared to a DM in isolation. A greater degree of transparency
unambiguously increases trader welfare as traders base their order submission strategies on a
larger information set. The impact of the degree of transparency on overall welfare depends
on the relative spread in the DM. When the relative spread is high, transparency ranks better
than both opaqueness settings. The positive contribution to welfare of order creation is then
substantial whereas the negative impact of trade diversion is limited. This result reverses
when the relative spread is low. In sum, our welfare analysis shows that greater transparency
might be beneﬁcial but that the ultimate answer hinges on the exact welfare criterion that
35is employed. Regulators therefore should stimulate transparency when considering trader
welfare. The answer is less clearcut when considering overall welfare.
Finally, our model oﬀers a number of empirical predictions. In particular, we ﬁnd system-
atic patterns in order ﬂow under transparency and partial opaqueness. These patterns stem
from changes in the imbalance at the CN’s order book. With transparency we ﬁnd that the
probability that the next order is a CN order at the same side of the market is smaller after
such an order than after any other order. Also, the probability of a DM sell decreases and the
probability of a DM buy increases when the previous order was a CN buy order. Only CN or-
ders generate time-varying order ﬂow on both trading systems as DM trades leave the CN’s
order book unaﬀected. Systematic patterns also arise with partial opaqueness. Although
traders now only observe past DM trades and no CN orders, they use this information to
form expectations on the CN’s order book imbalance and to determine their trading strategy.
We show that the degree of transparency at the CN has important implications for order
ﬂow. More speciﬁcally, compared to a transparent CN, order ﬂow patterns may reverse when
the CN is opaque. In general, our empirical predictions demonstrate that it is important to
take the interaction between trading systems, as well as their institutional characteristics,
into account when measuring “normal” order ﬂow. Some order or trade ﬂow sequences, when
analyzed in individual markets, could wrongly be interpreted as being driven by informed
trading, whereas they are actually caused by the interaction of trading systems. An inter-
esting empirical application of our model would therefore be to determine the importance of
this “interaction eﬀect” in explaining observed order ﬂow patterns relative to other factors
such as private information or dealers’ inventory management.
36Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Suppose ﬁrst that the trader arriving at time t is a buyer. She
selects her strategy to maximize her proﬁts, i.e. max
£
βtV − A,pb



































V − A otherwise
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increases in β at rate pb








increases at rate V . The condition
pb
t,tr ≥
¯ βV − A
¯ βV − (A + B)/2
can be interpreted as follows. If this condition is fulﬁlled, then pb
t,tr
¡¯ βV − (A + B)/2
¢
≥
¯ βV −A, implying that even for ¯ β the proﬁt of an order to the CN is higher than the proﬁto f
a DM trade. In that case, traders always choose to submit a CN order and the region of β’s























The cutoﬀ β’s between submitting an order to the CN and remaining out of the market
are determined by how large the trader’s valuation of the asset is, relative to its price. The






































































t,tr is a lower bound on CN selling because in the second case ps
t,tr
³








decreases in β at rate ps











(A + B)/2 − βV
can be understood as follows. If this condition is fulﬁlled, then ps
t,tr
¡
(A + B)/2 − βV
¢
≥
B −βV, meaning that even for β the proﬁt of an order to the CN is higher than the proﬁto f
a DM trade. In that case, traders will always choose to submit a CN order and the region of





















The cutoﬀ β’s between submitting an order to the CN and remaining out of the market
are determined by how large the trader’s valuation of the asset is, relative to its price. The
highest β-type who would CN sell is the one who values the asset at
(A+B)/2





























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We prove the proposition in a recursive way and by contradiction.
As a starting point, it can be seen that the proposition holds for the terminal period T.A t
time T, the execution probability of a CN order is either one (if a trader can join the strictly




























Suppose now that the proposition is false. However, since it is true at T,t h e r em u s te x i s ta
period τ such that for t>τ, all parts of the proposition hold, but at τ at least one part does
not hold.














































. In contrast, suppose that the trader would opt for a CN order in the former case


















, the trader submits a CN sell order, resulting






. The next trader, arriving at time τ +1,c a n
be either a buyer or a seller.
case a: A seller arrives at τ +1 .
















Moreover, due to time priority at the CN, an order that has been submitted in τ +1will
only be executed if the previous order in the queue has been executed. This means that

















|seller arrives at τ +1
´
.




























|seller arrives at τ +1
´
≥ B − βτV.
Hence, if the trader at time τ +1is a seller, the payoﬀ of a CN sell order is higher when the
sell side of the CN’s order book in the CN is thinner in period τ. Hence, it cannot be optimal
for an investor to submit a DM trade when the queue at the sell side is shorter.
case b: A buyer arrives at τ +1 .
39We know that by assumption (ii) is true at τ +1 . This means that either traders do not

























, which results in a CN’s order book












g i v i n gab o o ka tτ +2of
¡
cb
τ +1 ,c s
τ − 1
¢

































Since an order submitted at τ +2can only be executed if an order submitted at time τ has




























|buyer arrives at τ +1
´
≥ B − βτV.
Hence, conditional upon a buyer arriving at time τ +1 , there is a contradiction.
Statement (iv) is therefore true.
A symmetric proof can be constructed for (i). Along the same lines as above, the other
parts of the proposition can be proven.
























Suppose that the order imbalance in the CN cb
t − |cs
t| <T− t − 1, such that the probability
of execution of a CN buy is not zero. Then βb
t+1,tr (ct+1) is independent of the CN’s order
40book. If the order at t was a CN buy order, then the CN-book at t+1is
¡
cb
t +1 ,c s
t
¢
,i fi tw a s






and if the order was a DM trade, the CN-book


























Since F (.) is monotonically nondecreasing in β, the result follows.
Suppose now that cb
t−|cs
t| ≥ T−t−1, this means that either no CN orders are submitted, in
which case the proposition holds trivially, or at time t the extra CN order submitted changes





t +1 ,c s
t
¢
= A/V ; hence the result
follows since also βb
t+1,tr (ct+1)=A/V .
A similar proof can be constructed for CN sell orders.
























is ﬁxed and independent of the CN’s order book. If the order at t was a CN buy order,
then the CN’s order book at t +1is
¡
cb
t +1 ,c s
t
¢







and if the order was a DM trade, the CN’s order book does not change:


























Since F (.) is monotonically nondecreasing in β, the result follows.
A similar proof can be constructed for CN sell orders
Before starting the proof of Proposition 7, we ﬁrst state the following corollary:
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, at any time t, if the expected CN’s order book at the buy side is
one unit thicker, then the probability of execution of a buy (sell) order will be lower (higher).
If the CN’s expected order book at the sell side is one unit thicker, then the probability of
execution of a buy (sell) order will be higher (lower). If the expected book is one unit thicker
at the buy side and one unit thicker at the sell side, then the probability of execution for both
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t) − 1
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(both formulations, in terms of probabilities and in terms of betas, are equivalent).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . The proof proceeds along the same lines as the one of Proposition
2 and is omitted for brevity.































T − t − 1, such that the expected probability of execution of a CN buy is not zero. Then
βb
t+1,po (Et+1,po (ct+1)) is independent of the CN’s order book.
Suppose at t a DM trade is observed, then the expected CN book does not change: since
ct = ct+1,t h e nEt+1,po (ct)=Et+1,po (ct+1)=Et,po (ct+1).
































depending on whether at t a CN buy, CN sell or no order was submitted. The probabilities
of occurrence of each case can be computed from F (.),πS,πB and the expected book at t.







































+ π1,E t+1,po (cs
t) − π2
´
since π1 + π2 + π3 =1 .
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t) − π2
´
Three cases can occur:
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T − t − 1. This means that either no CN orders are expected to have been submitted,
in which case the proposition holds trivially, or at time t the extra CN order submit-
ted changes the expected CN book such that the execution probability becomes zero. In









+1 ,E t+1,po (cs
t)
¢
= A/V ; hence the result follows since also
βb
t+1,po (Et,po (ct+1)) = A/V .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . This proof proceeds along the same line as the proof of Propo-
sition 7 and is omitted for brevity.
.
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No Buy Order DM Buy 
DM Sell  No Sell Order
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the equilibrium of our model with only a dealer
market. The optimal strategies of agents are drawn, conditional upon
their β and trading orientation.
Figure 1: Order Submission Strategies with a Dealer Market in Isolation






No Buy Order CN  Buy
No Sell Order CN Sell 
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the equilibrium of our model with only a cross-
ing network. The optimal strategies of agents are drawn, conditional
upon their β and trading orientation.





















No Buy Order CN  Buy DM Buy 
No Sell Order CN Sell DM Sell
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the equilibrium of our model with a dealer
market and a crossing network for transparency. The optimal strategies
of agents are drawn, conditional upon their β and trading orientation.
Figure 3: Order Submission Strategies with Dealer Market and Crossing Network
50Note: This ﬁgure presents the average per-period overall welfare OW
DM
and trader welfare TW
DM
(upper and lower dashed lines, respectively)
for the DM in isolation, as well as average per-period welfare W
CN
for
a CN in isolation (full lines), for diﬀerent values of T (i.e. 2 to 8)a sa
function of the value of the asset V .
Figure 4: Welfare for Markets in Isolation
51Note: This ﬁgure presents average per-period overall welfare for trans-
parency OW
CN−DM,tr
and partial opaqueness OW
CN−DM,po
.T r a n s -
parency is presented as a thin dotted line, partial opaqueness with a
thin full line. Also overall welfare for the DM in isolation OW
DM
is
included for comparison as a thin line, marked with crosses (x). Thick





(again dotted and full lines, respectively).
Trader welfare in the DM in isolation TW
DM
is shown as a thick line,
marked with crosses (x). The results for complete opaqueness are very
close to those of partial opaqueness and are therefore not shown.
Figure 5: Coexistence: Average Per-Period Overall Welfare and Trader Welfare
52Note: This ﬁgure presents the “TW order creation eﬀect” and the “TW
trade diversion eﬀect” for the three informational settings, i = tr,co,po
(dotted, dashed and full lines, respectively). Thin lines are the order cre-
ation eﬀect, while thick lines represent the trade diversion eﬀect. Jointly,





Figure 6: Coexistence: Trader Welfare Order Creation and Trade Diversion Eﬀect
53Note: This ﬁgure presents trader welfare decomposed in the part that
is generated in the CN (thick lines) and in the DM (thin lines). Trans-
parency is presented as dotted lines and partial opaqueness with full
lines. Results for complete opaqueness are very close to those for partial
opaqueness and are therefore not shown.
Figure 7: Coexistence: Decomposition of Trader Welfare generated in the DM
and the CN
54Note: This ﬁgure displays TW for the transparency and partial opaque-
ness for T =2 ,3 and 4.
Figure 8: Coexistence: Average Per-Period Trader Welfare for Various Lengths
of the Trading Day
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